Impact of board characteristics on IPO valuation: Evidence from Finland and Sweden by Weiland, Juha
  
 
 
Impact of board characteristics on IPO valuation 
Evidence from Finland and Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Juha Weiland 
Aalto University School of Business 
Accounting 
Spring 2018 
  
 
Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 
 
 
Author  Juha Weiland 
Title of thesis  Impact of board characteristics on IPO valuation: Evidence from Finland and 
Sweden 
Degree  Master’s degree 
Degree programme  Accounting 
Thesis advisor(s)  Seppo Ikäheimo 
Year of approval  2018 Number of pages  55 Language  English 
Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide insights on how the characteristics of board affect valuation 
of entities offering an initial public offer. The agency theory portrays that the interests of company 
management and investors are in conflict by nature. Development of corporate governance has been 
proposed as a one of the most effective methods to certify the quality of the financial reporting and 
create trust in the market. As a company implements an effective corporate governance model it can 
be assumed that the trust towards the quality of financial reporting is improved among the market 
participants and the required rate of return decreases. 
This study examines the impact of board characteristics on the valuation of Initial Public Offerings 
in Finland and Sweden during 2012-2015. This is especially interesting period as the IPO market 
has been very active during past years and therefore there is a broad sample of stock listings that 
will be examined in this study. Further, this study examines differences between the Regulated 
Market (Nasdaq Exchanges) and the less strict First North market place (Multilateral Trading 
Facility). This will provide comparison of characteristics of companies listing in the two market 
places. This comparison has not been studied at large in the academia before, as the Nasdaq Fist 
North is relatively young market place established in Sweden in 2006 and expanded to Finland the 
following year. 
The study was conducted by performing an OLS regression, correlation analysis and descriptive 
statistics.  The results of the study show that the structure of boards is relatively consistent across 
the sample and variance among the firm observations is small. However, we can see differences in 
the board characteristics especially when comparing IPOs between the Main market and First North 
listings. Firms listed in the main market have larger boards, higher rate of independent board 
members, and more equal gender representation. Also, we can identify gradual movements in the 
structures of boards when analysing the trends in time series noting increase in independent 
members in First North listing while gender representation has increased in Main market listings. 
Meanwhile, in our regression analysis the only board characteristic that we found to have significant 
correlation with IPO valuation was board size. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
In the modern financial markets, the ownership of companies is often separated from the 
management of the business and the shareholder base is dispersed broadly. This set up 
creates information asymmetries between the owners of the capital and the management 
who oversee the business. The conflict of interest between management and investors is 
generally called as agency problem made famous by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Therefore, there has become a great need to improve and develop the governance of firms 
to build up trust among firms and the investors in the capital market. This ensures efficient 
allocation of capital in the financial markets and prevents misappropriation of the capital 
within the firms, thus, contributing to the accountability of management towards the 
investors (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Thus, it is in the interests of the society to 
enhance solutions to mitigate the information asymmetries and to facilitate the effective 
allocation of capital between firms and investors. Generally, mechanisms to increase the 
trust in the financial markets include financial reporting regulation, auditors and 
information intermediaries, and corporate governance structures (Healy et al. 2001). 
The public scrutiny over these governance mechanisms has increased due to the financial 
crises taken place during the second millennium. (Adams et al. 2010). Regulation provides 
rules for shareholder protection and equality, expropriation of assets by management etc. 
that build trust in the society and thus can lower the risk premium required by investors 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Enhanced quality of financial information reporting supports 
the equity value of a firm through lower estimation risk by investors, better financial 
information available to investors to select investments and assess management 
performance, and improved liquidity as more investors are willing to participate in the 
market Bushman et al. (2001). 
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A key solution to improve the trust and efficient functioning of the financial markets has 
become corporate governance. The focus on corporate governance and development on the 
principles is driven both by legislation such as requirements in Finnish corporate law or 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US as well as principles and recommendations implemented by 
the industry on a voluntary basis.   
Boards have been elevated to the center of focus in the regulation reforms and academic 
research (Adams et al. 2010). The role of board is to represent the interests of the investors 
and monitor the actions of management reducing the information gap between the agent 
and principle (e.g. Fama & Jensen 1983, Hermalin et al. 2003). Board’s role as a 
mechanism to monitor the top management has been studied widely in the past research 
and is typically summarized in two key tasks: hiring, firing, and assessment of 
management, and setting strategy (Adams et al. 2010).  
However, the impact of board structure on valuation of firms offering IPO has not been 
covered in the past literature especially in Finland. This is an interesting topic as 
companies planning to make IPO are likely to assess its governance structures and 
optimize the structure to attract maximum value for the shares from marketplace. This may 
be different situation compared to an established company which has dispersed shareholder 
base and is not looking for funding at a similar scale. Further, this study examines 
differences between the between the Regulated Market (Nasdaq Exchanges) and the less 
strict First North market place (Multilateral Trading Facility). This will provide 
comparison of characteristics of companies listing in the two marketplaces, which has not 
been subject to past studies. 
 
1.2 The objective and scope of the research 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide insights on how the characteristics of board affect 
valuation of entities offering an initial public offer. The agency theory portrays that the 
interests of company management and investors are in conflict by nature, which establishes 
distrust between the principal and the agent. Development of corporate governance has 
been proposed as a one of the most effective methods to certify the quality of the financial 
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reporting and create trust in the market. As a company implements an effective corporate 
governance model, it can be assumed that the trust towards the quality of financial 
reporting is improved among the market participants and the required rate of return 
decreases. 
This study examines the impact of board characteristics on the pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings in Finland and Sweden during 2012-2015. By taking the two Nordic countries 
into the scope of the study we will have broad overview of the IPOs in the Nordics. This is 
especially interesting period as the IPO market has been very active during past years and 
therefore there is a broad sample of stock listings that will be examined in this study. 
Further, this study examines differences between the Nasdaq Main market (Regulated 
market) and the less strict First North market place (Multilateral Trading Facility). This 
will provide comparison of characteristics of companies listing in the two market places. 
This comparison has not been studied at large in the academia before, as the Nasdaq Fist 
North is relatively young market place. First North was established in Sweden in 2006 and 
expanded to Finland the following year.  
Additionally, this study provides descriptive statistics over differences in IPOs between 
Finland and Sweden. While both of the countries are Nordic and share common 
characteristics in the corporate governance models, the capital markets and economies 
have differences in terms of the width and maturity of the equity and stock markets. 
Sweden has more versatile and larger market cap in public companies compared to 
Finland. This can be expected to impact the valuations and the set up of boards in the 
listing companies. Additionally, this study examines the differences between the between 
the Regulated Market (Nasdaq Exchanges) and the less strict Multilateral Trading Facility 
marketplace (First North). 
In the study, we examine the board characteristics in terms of board size, independent 
members, CEO-chairman duality, and gender distribution as these have been considered in 
the past literature as factors of board efficiency contributing firm performance and 
valuation by investors. 
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1.3 Research design 
 
This study examines the impact of board characteristics on the pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings in Finland and Sweden during 2012-2015. The research is conducted based on 
data from Nasdaq, Orbis database, and prospectuses published by the companies during the 
IPO process. 
The first goal of this paper is examine the differences in board characteristics between 
Nasdaq and the First North markets in Finland and Sweden. We will examine the 
differences and similarities of the boards through descriptive statistics. With this method 
we can observe the harmonization of board set ups between the two market places as well 
as the two Nordic countries.  
The second goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the board characteristics on the 
valuations of companies offering new IPOs. We will compare the IPO valuations relative 
to the board characteristics by using an OLS regression model. We will use Tobin’s Q 
(market price / book value) to determine the relative market valuation of the IPOs. Tobin’s 
Q has been used to measure the IPO valuations in the past (e.g. Welbourne et al. 1996). 
Additionally, we will include in the regression control variables to account for the external 
factors influencing the valuations.  
 
1.4 The structure of the study 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The second chapter includes an introduction to 
corporate governance research as well as specifically board’s role in mitigating the agency 
and information asymmetry problems between management and investors. The literature 
review will cover key board characteristics driving board effectiveness. Based on the past 
literature we will present our hypotheses over the relationship between board 
characteristics and IPO valuation in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter, we will present 
the data and methodology to perform the empirical study. In the fifth chapter, we will 
present the findings of the empirical model analyze the results. In the sixth chapter, we will 
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discuss the results and possible limitation of the study. In the final chapter of the study we 
will conclude the study by summarizing the results and reflecting considerations on 
potential future research.  
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2. BOARD AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 Information asymmetries in the capital markets 
 
In the modern financial markets, the ownership of companies is often separated from the 
management of the business and the shareholder base is dispersed broadly. The 
shareholders do not have visibility into the daily actions of the managing directors who are 
responsible for running the business and allocating the assets efficiently. This set up 
creates information asymmetries between the owners of the capital and the management 
who are in charge of the business. Therefore, there has become a great need to improve and 
develop the governance of firms to build up trust among the firms and the investors in the 
capital market. This ensures efficient allocation of capital in the financial markets and 
prevents misappropriation of the capital within the firms, thus, contributing to the 
accountability of management towards the investors.  
The “lemons” problem, as presented famously by Akerlof (1970), arises from the 
information differences and conflicting incentives between the sellers and buyers. In his 
paper, Akerlof, argues that entrepreneurs and investors are rational and take advantage of 
the information available to them. For example, if an entrepreneur is looking for an 
investment in his business idea they will claim the idea to be good regardless if the idea is 
actually bad or good in order to maximize their gain. If the investors are not able to 
validate which ideas are actually good and which not they will make the investment based 
on the average level. Thus the bad ideas receives more and good ideas less than they 
should making the markets less efficient and at worst destructing the marketplace.  This 
conflict of interest has generally been accepted as an underpinning element in the 
relationship between management and investors in the capital markets (e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). Thus, it is in the interests of the society to enhance solutions to mitigate the 
information asymmetries and to enhance the effective allocation of capital between firms 
and investors. 
In the past research, there has been a number of studies to solve the information 
asymmetries between investors and firms (see Healy et al. 2001). Suggestions to solve the 
issue include optimal contracts between management and investors with incentives for full 
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disclose transparency of the firm financial information. Another solution of the information 
asymmetry is regulation that commands management for information sharing. 
Additionally, intermediaries, such as analysts and rating agencies, provide analysis of firm 
performance and narrow the gap between management and investors.   
 
2.1.1 Agency theory 
 
The implications of information asymmetry in the capital markets links directly to the 
principle-agent problem that is a dominant theory in the past literature. The theory tries to 
explain the relationship between management (agent) and investors (principle). The 
relationship between management and investors has become of significant interest in the 
past research since the ownership of companies has dispersed into small pieces in the 
global financial markets and the management function has become largely separated from 
the shareholders. 
The agency problem occurs when an investors provide capital to business where they 
typically will not hold any active position in managing the company. The management 
function has been delegated to the professional directors who operate the business on 
behalf of the shareholders. As a result, the management are able to consume the investment 
for self-interested purposes that benefit management but not the investors (see Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). This problem is intensified if the shareholder base is widely dispersed 
which is the case is most of the listed companies.  
The owners, naturally, make an effort to ensure that the management act in the owners’ 
interests and do not exploit the company’s resources. These efforts borne by the investors 
are called agency costs that Jensen and Meckling (1976) divided in three types: 1) the 
monitoring expenditures borne by the principle, 2) bonding expenditures borne by the 
agent that limit the decision making of the agent, and 3) residual loss that incur regardless 
of the monitoring and bonding expenditures. Examples of the monitoring expenditures 
include external and internal audit, formal control systems, budget restrictions and 
incentive compensation contracts with management. Bonding expenditures relate to 
expenses borne by agent to guarantee alignment with the shareholder interest such as 
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contractual limitations on the manager’s decision making power which impose costs to the 
company as well since the manager is not able take full advantage of all opportunities. The 
residual loss represents costs that take place regardless of the monitoring and bonding 
activities. 
The issue under the agency theory is the separation of control and ownership of capital as 
the agent takes care of the capital owned by the principle. The separation of control and 
ownership is especially present in the listed companies (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
Therefore, compensation agreements to incentivize management to act in the owners’ 
interests is a key element to develop the firm structures (e.g. Jensen & Meckling 1976, 
Fama 1980). An efficient compensation agreement aligns the interest of agent and 
principle. 
The interests of manager and owner are in conflict either when a manager is too risk 
adverse and restrict the actions to take opportunities that maximize the firm performance or 
the manager takes excessive risks to reach to the compensation targets (Fama 1980). 
Compensation agreements are effective when they are designed appropriately to link the 
firm success to the compensation paid to the management. When we consider the process 
for implementing and monitoring the optimal contracts between management and the 
shareholders board of directors is usually the body which has responsibility over the 
aligning the interests between the two parties. The board is considered as the pivotal 
governance mechanism for the alignment of interests (e.g. Fama & Jensen 1983). As the 
past literature has found that board has a key role in the corporate governance structure of 
firms we will focus on the board’s role in the valuation of IPOs in this paper. 
 
2.1.2 Information asymmetries and firm valuation 
 
As we have noted in the previous sections, there is an inherent tension between 
management and investors due to the separation of control and ownership of capital. The 
information asymmetries between management and shareholders is driven by the agent-
principle problem. The agency costs borne by the investors are reflected in the pricing that 
investors are willing to pay for securities. The costs associated with the monitoring 
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activities such as management’s compensation agreements, audit fees, administration 
expenses for corporate governance etc., is readily measurable based on the income 
statement. Additionally, the investors take into account the residual loss when they 
determine the price they are willing to pay for share in the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). Based on the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976) the investors cannot 
completely eliminate the costs associated with the residual loss because management will 
always have some possibilities to make decisions with self-interest. Given this conflict of 
interest between management and investors we will next consider how does the existence 
of information asymmetries translate into the investors’ willingness to offer capital to 
firms. 
The financial markets are deemed to digest all the publicly available information and use 
the information to allocate capital to the most profitable options. Fama (1970) posits in his 
famous Efficient Market hypothesis that a market is efficient when “security prices fully 
reflect all available information”. As such, it in the interest of the society that information 
is readily available to the market participants. As such, under the Efficient Market 
hypothesis we can expect that disclosure of information that is relevant to the firm 
performance is valuable to the investors and thus affecting valuation of equity.   
Research focused on the functioning of capital markets has accumulated evidence implying 
that markets tend to be informationally inefficient. A body of research, which has 
performed fundamental analyses over trading strategies, has found abnormal returns spread 
over multiple years. The research suggests that prices might take years before reflecting 
available information (Kothari 2001). In his review of the literature, Kothari notes that 
there is a large interest among the academia, investors and standard setters to examine the 
significance of earnings management in relation to reported financial statements. 
Therefore, we can observe from the past research that firms operate in capital markets that 
are subject to imperfections of information and are exposed to risk of earnings 
management. Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms and the role of board can 
contribute to the protection of investors and efficient functioning of the markets.  
Furthermore, past research focusing on the relationship between voluntary disclosures and 
reduced cost of capital show that management’s actions to decrease information 
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asymmetry results in increased security valuation. Healy et al. (2001) summarize the past 
literature documenting the number of disclosures increases and the analysts’ ratings of the 
disclosures improves before firms raise new capital. These observations show that firms 
that raise new capital increase their disclosures towards investors, thus, implying that the 
cost of capital decreases when firms increase sharing of information. This is also supported 
by Verrecchia (2001) who posits that information asymmetry is a component of cost of 
capital. He argues that the decision by management not to disclose specific information is a 
trade off whereby management benefits from the reduced disclosure (for example due to 
cost of disclosure preparation, proprietary information, competition sensitive information 
etc.) and pays for it as a higher cost of capital.  
Based on review of the past research we have noted that information asymmetries 
influence the valuations that investors are willing to pay for an interest in a firm. This 
correlation can be expected to motivate firms to develop their quality of reporting towards 
external investors. This would be the especially if the company has rigid governance 
structure supporting the integrity of management and thus supporting management to 
maximize the firm value. This premise is supported by Bushman et al. (2001) who in their 
paper convey that enhanced quality of financial information reporting supports the equity 
value of a firm through lower estimation risk by investors, better financial information 
available to investors to select investments and assess management performance, and 
improved liquidity as more investors are willing to participate in the market. In the next 
section we will consider how firms would reduce the information asymmetries and gain 
trust of the investors. 
 
2.1.3 Confronting information asymmetries 
 
Healy et al. (2001) compose a framework to assess the key determinants of the information 
asymmetry and principle-agent problems. They propose three main attributes to solve the 
conflicting interests between agent and principle. These include 1) role of financial 
reporting regulation, 2) effectiveness of auditors and information intermediaries, and 3) 
corporate governance factors driving management’s decisions to disclose information. In 
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this section we will discuss the characteristics of these three factors on information 
asymmetries between management and investors. 
Regulation over financial reporting and corporate rules pertains to the financial reporting 
requirements, legal institutions, and corporate governance models. Recently in the 
academia, the focus of testing only one of these attributes the focus has rather shifted to 
consider a bundle of the different aspects of regulation (Aguilera et al. 2008). The public 
scrutiny over these governance mechanisms has increased due to the financial crises taken 
place during the second millennium. (Adams et al. 2010). Notable developments in the 
regulation include increased disclosure of information in US GAAP and IFRS, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, and the development of corporate governance models in 
various countries. The regulation provides rules for shareholder protection and equality, 
expropriation of assets by management etc. that build trust in the society (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997) and thus can lower the risk premium required by investors.  
Audit and intermediaries perform services that validate management’s assertions over the 
financial reporting. The audit services are subject to the regulatory framework but research 
shows that external financers require hiring of external auditors even when regulation does 
not command an audit implying that investors value the audit opinion. The past research 
has not found a significant value add in audit opinions to the investors, however, the 
research implies that investors deem auditors as enhancing credibility. (Healy et al. 2001).  
In addition, there is past academic literature on the role of financial analysts on investor 
decision making. The research shows that some disclosures produces by the financial 
intermediaries affect the stock price and thus are of value to investors. The research notes 
risk of credibility issues for instance if auditor is minimizing its own liabilities instead of 
enhancing the financial report credibility or auditor act in the interests of management who 
hire them. Further, the literature posits that financial analysts have incentive for over-
optimistic forecasts in order to stimulate the trading activity (Healy at al. 2001). These 
reviews over the past research show that the financial intermediaries add value to the 
mitigation information asymmetries but not without issues. The scope of these services do 
not solve on their own the issue of the information asymmetry problem. 
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Finally, the last piece of the information asymmetry problem is the role of corporate 
governance in managing the financial reporting of firms. Shleifer et al. (1997) defined 
corporate governance as a mean to “assure financiers that they get a return on their 
financial investment.” Boards have been elevated to the center of focus in the regulation 
reforms and academic research. (Adams et al. 2010). The role of board is to represent the 
interests of the investors and monitors the actions of management (e.g. Fama & Jensen 
1983, Hermalin et al. 2003). 
One of the key aspect on how the board fulfills this role is the design of the management 
compensation packages and monitoring of the compensation. These so call “optimal 
contracts” thrive to align the interests of the management and the shareholders (Bebchuk & 
Fried 2003). The significance of corporate governance has grown in the past decades and 
during the 21st century the development and implementation of the corporate governance 
structures both in Nordics and internationally. This is evidenced by the constant updates in 
the codes (e.g., examples of updates in corporate code issues/updates include Sarbanes-
Oaxley act in 2002, Finnish Corporate Governance Code in 2015, OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance in 2015 etc). 
The secondary key task of board is generally regarded contribution to setting firm’s 
strategy. Board are expected to collaborate with management on evaluation strategic 
decisions, help management on the decision making and monitoring the strategic direction 
of firm. For this purpose the board members’ knowledge and credentials are valued as an 
attribute (Adams et al. 2010). 
In the next section, we will discuss the corporate governance principles and how these may 
influence the trust in market place and reduce the cost of external capital. 
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2.2 Corporate governance and role of board 
 
2.2.1 Definition of corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance has been a topic of interest in the economic research dating back to 
Adam Smith’s famous publication The Wealth of Nations (see Adams et al. 2010). In 
essence, the purpose of corporate governance is to develop mechanisms that ensure 
efficient management of enterprises that benefit the investors of business without 
discrimination. The steady operation of firms also benefits the societies because investors 
are able to allocate resources to the most profitable destinations, thus, maximizing the 
value potential of the economic activity. For instance, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) state 
“corporate governance deals with the agency problem: the separation of management and 
finance.” Their definition focuses on protection of the external investors’ return on an 
investment. More recently, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance have been 
revised in 2015 and in the publication corporate governance was defined as:  
 
“The purpose of corporate governance is to help build an environment of trust, 
transparency and accountability necessary for fostering long-term investment, financial 
stability and business integrity, thereby supporting stronger growth and more inclusive 
societies.” (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015) 
 
Comparing the definitions of corporate governance between the Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
and the OECD we can see that former is more limited to the goal of investor welfare 
protection and maximization while the latter definition accounts for more broad 
implications of efficient corporate governance mechanisms.  
Corporate governance can be characterized as a complex set of mechanisms which are 
utilized to discipline management to act in the interest of the investors. The control 
mechanisms include both internal mechanisms such as, managerial incentive plans, 
director monitoring, and the internal labor market, and external mechanisms, such as 
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outside shareholder or debtor monitoring, the market for corporate control, competition in 
the product market, the external managerial labor market, and securities laws (Bushman & 
Smith 2001). These different mechanisms construct the corporate governance package. 
Bushman & Smith (2001) observe that historically the accounting research has heavily 
emphasized the role of the management compensation plans as a key element for incentive 
alignment. This has largely been influenced by the frequent use of compensation contracts 
in the listed companies in the US and the availability of related executive compensation 
data enabling extensive set of data for research. 
Roe (2004) also outlines corporate governance in internal and external mechanism. Roe 
divides the internal mechanisms in two dimensions. First, the corporate governance has a 
horizontal dimension that is the relationship between the dominant shareholders and the 
dispersed shareholders. The focus of the horizontal dimension is to prevent and minimize 
the transfer of capital from the dispersed shareholders to the dominant shareholders who 
are able to influence control of a company and management decisions. Second, in Roe’s 
model the corporate governance includes a vertical dimension that pertains to the dynamics 
between management and the dispersed stockholder base. This relationship relates to the 
theory of principle-agent and information asymmetry problems discussed in earlier 
sections and where the dominant is dominantly compensation contracts to align interests of 
management with those of the shareholders. Finally, Roe’s model includes the external 
corporate governance mechanisms that relate to the legislative rules regulated by the 
political processes, which thrive to legitimize the governance of companies and create 
common set of rules.  
As we have defined the key elements of corporate governance, we will next discuss the 
role of board in the corporate governance framework. 
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2.2.2 Board as a component of corporate governance 
 
Board has a pivotal role in the corporate governance structures which is highlighted by the 
long history of board as a mechanism to manage companies, corporate governance 
principles such as OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015) or Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code 2015 that lay out specific recommendations for companies to set up a 
board, and the tasks and requirements of boards defined in various legislations. As such it 
is important to review the roles and tasks of board in modern corporate governance to 
better understand its existence and impact on managing a firm. 
One argument for existence of boards is the legislation in various countries where firms are 
required to set up a board that has been laid out specific requirements in the governance of 
businesses. For instance, in Finland, the corporate law requires companies to elect board 
with specific tasks to monitor the business and ensure compliance with laws. Hermalin & 
Weisbach (2003) point out that while state and stock exchanges define various 
requirements for firms to structure the composition and tasks of boards, the boards are not 
set up to the bare minimum. This indicates that the board function is not solely a legal 
function but rather there is demand for the boards to act a body within the business 
management.  
Consistent with the agency and information asymmetry problems discussed in the previous 
section, boards are usually associated as a tool to reduce this information gap between the 
agent and principle. In the literature review conducted by Adams et al. (2010) they 
summarized the role board in two key tasks: hiring, firing, and assessment of management, 
and setting strategy. The board’s role as a mechanism to monitor the top management has 
been studied widely in the past research. For instance, Hermalin & Weisbach (1998) stated 
that one of the key tasks of board is to decide on hiring and firing of top management. 
Besides evaluation of management, board is deemed to add value as strategic actor that 
together with management evaluates strategic choices (e.g. Adams et al. 2010, Forbes & 
Milliken 1999). 
As we can see past research has identified board’s main activities as monitoring of top 
management and contributing to the strategic decision making. We can note these are 
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strategically important tasks for a successful firm and therefore an efficient board can 
positively contribute to firm performance. Thus, it begs to question what contributes to an 
effective board set up. In the next section, we will discuss the key relationship between 
board characteristics and the board’s ability to execute its tasks.  
 
2.3 Board characteristics as a factor of firm valuation 
 
In the previous sections, we have noted that board has a significant role in the execution 
and monitoring of effective corporate governance. Board’s principle task is the selection of 
top management and monitoring of the management performance ensuring that 
management acts in the interests of the investors (e.g. Farma & Jensen 1983). As such, 
board is considered as a key element in the current corporate governance mechanisms 
adopted in the various jurisdictions. While an efficiently operating board is a part of 
solution to the agent-principle problem, board can become part of the problem if 
management is able to influence the board structure and incentives adversely (Bebchuck & 
Fried 2003). Thus, board may fail in its role to represent the principle and instead act as an 
agent. Therefore, past research has focused on the questions of what factors and 
characteristics contribute to an optimal board. In this section, we consider the past 
literature on the topic of board characteristics. 
 
2.3.1 Board size 
 
Board size has been studied and proposed as an attribute that influences the effectiveness 
of board’s ability to operate. If a board is too large it runs the risk of becoming too 
bureaucratic and inefficient to make decisions while too small a composition is less likely 
to have the optimal know-how and exchange of ideas to achieve best solutions. The 
relationship between oversized boards and inefficient decision making has been 
documented in the past research (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Further, the free 
rider problem arises when the size of board is too big (Hermalin & Weisbach 2003).  
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Similar relationship between the board size and effectiveness of corporate governance have 
been found in other research papers. Large board size have been associated with awarding 
larger compensation packages to CEO (Core at al. 1999; Cahan et al. 2005). As the 
measuring and deciding for management compensation is a key task for board the more 
lucrative compensation associated with larger boards is indicative of management’s ability 
to influence larger boards.  
Lipton and Lorch (1992) propose a preferred number of board seats is eight or nine 
members. Jensen (1993) has similar result in his study stating that a board with more than 
seven or eight members are likely to be less functional and more easily to be influenced by 
CEO due to the dispersed power in board with too many members. Yermack (1996) had 
similar results in his paper concluding that small boardrooms increase firm’s market value. 
Coles et al. (2008) found in their paper that the correlation between board size and 
effectiveness is not linear but rather the optimal board size is also dependent on the 
characteristics of the firm. Complex firms (e.g., R&D intensive business) have larger board 
rooms because they have greater need for advising while firms in more straightforward 
industries require smaller boards. Overall, the past research on the topic implies that larger 
boards negatively affect a board’s ability to operate in an efficient manner. 
 
2.3.2 Board independence 
 
The board’s main responsibility is to monitor the top management ensuring its actions 
serve the shareholders. Further, the board acts as an advisory counsel to the management 
taking part into the strategic decision making that has effects on the long-term performance 
of business. The theory and different studies in the academic research show that 
independence of board improves board’s ability to fulfill its role in the safeguard of the 
investors and this has been noted to correlate positively with firm performance (see Coles 
et al .2008).  
There are mixed evidences of the correlation between independence and firm performance. 
Previous studies have found a positive correlation between board independence and firm 
performance. Byrd et al (1992) observed in their test that companies with more than 50% 
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independent board members had higher returns on tender offers than the counterparts with 
less independent boards. Similar results were examined by Cotter et al. (1997) showing 
that firms, which have more independent boards, are paid higher premiums in acquisition 
bids. This is interesting observation which implies that for IPO valuation, too, the board 
independence drives higher valuations. Meanwhile, other studies have failed to see a 
positive correlation between board independence and firm performance. Hermalin & 
Weisbach (1991) used Tobin’s Q to measure the impact of board independence on firm 
performance and noted to relation between the two variables. Similar results were 
concluded by Bhagat & Black (2002) in a later study.  
While the past research has examined mixed results with the relationship of board 
independence and financial performance, other measures have also been examined relating 
to board independence. Weisbach (1988) showed that when a company is performing 
poorly board seats are more likely to be filled with independent members, which suggests 
that independent members are regarded as more effective directors than management 
representatives. Klein (2002) found in a quantitative test a negative correlation between 
proportion of independent directors and earning management measured through abnormal 
accruals. Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) in their survey made similar notions concluding 
that board composition has not been exhaustively evidenced to associate with firm 
performance. However, they stated that board composition appears to correlate positively 
with corporate governance issues including CEO replacement, acquisitions, poison pills 
and executive composition. As such, these observations indicate that board independence 
may contribute positively to investors’ perception of a firm’s governance and thus add to 
the valuation of an entity.  
 
2.3.3 CEO-chairman duality 
 
The corporate governance recommendations suggest that CEO should not chair the board 
of directors. For instance, the Finnish Corporate Governance Code (Securities Market 
Association 2015) recommendation 20 states that the CEO is restricted to chair the board. 
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Consensus over separation of the two roles is also shared in the academic literature, which 
we discuss in this section. 
The role of board is to represent the interests of the investors and monitors the actions of 
management (e.g. Fama & Jensen 1983, Hermalin et al. 2003). One of the key aspect on 
how the board fulfills this role is the design of top management compensation packages 
and monitoring of the compensation. Therefore, it is logical that a conflict of interests 
arises and the board’s ability to perform the task of monitoring management and deciding 
on the compensation is adversely affected if the CEO chairs the board (Jensen 1993). The 
separation of CEO and chairman roles is also consistent with the agent-principle problem 
as the purpose of the board is to represent the principle and advocate their interests. 
 While in theory, the CEO could excuse himself or herself from the decision making over 
the management compensation and performance evaluation in practice this is difficult 
because the chair has a pivotal role in leading the board and is constantly working with the 
board members over setting the agenda and other principle tasks of the board. (Cahan et al. 
2005). Furthermore, the CEO has an incentive to “capture” the board in order to secure his 
or her job and maximize the compensation. (Hermalin et al. 2003). The unfavorable 
implications of CEO-chairman dual role was, for instance, observed in a study by Farber 
(2005) showing that fraud was more common in companies with CEO as a chair of the 
board. Also, the a positive correlation between CEO compensation and CEO-chairman 
duality has been documented in the past research (e.g. Core al al 1999, Cahan et al. 2005). 
These findings indicate that the board is less efficient in restricting the power of CEO 
when the CEO is the chair. As such, these findings in the previous studies indicate that the 
effectiveness of board is harmed when the CEO has the dual position and as such might 
negatively affect the valuation investors give to a company. 
 
2.3.4 Gender representation 
 
Gender diversity has been a frequent topic on the policy making of many countries (Adams 
et al. 2015). Norway is a famous example of the legislative requirement for gender 
diversity as the country implemented gender quota of 40% of board seats at listed 
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companies in 2003 (Ahern et al. 2012). In Finland, there are not legal requirements for 
gender quotas. However, the Finnish corporate governance code, which is the business 
society’s self-regulation, includes a recommendation to have both genders represented in 
the board (Securities Market Association (Finland) 2015). Further, the Finnish government 
declared a principle in 2015 stating that the large and mid-sized listed companies should 
have minimum of 40% representation of each gender  by the year 2020 (Finnish Chambers 
of Commerce 2016). Thus, we can see that the gender equality in the board room is an 
active topic in the policy decision making both in the governmental as well as the business 
institutions in various countries. Therefore, the gender diversity is a topical matter and we 
will next look for what the previous studies have documented over the gender diversity in 
boards. 
Past studies have examined how the gender diversity affects the dynamics of board 
functions. Adams et al. (2015) summarized in their literature review that diversity has been 
argued to improve efficiency of boards and it has been suggested that the ethical behaviors 
vary between female and males directors. Further, studies have proposed that women are 
more risk-averse. However, a contradicting evidence was noted in a study over Swedish 
boards, where Adams and Funk (2012) concluded that female directors were more inclined 
to take risk compared to male counterparts.   
Also, the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance has been subject to 
various studies. Post and Byron (2015) performed a meta-analysis of female directors’ 
impact on firm performance by combining 140 past studies. They noted that female board 
representation was associated with accounting returns. Further, they found that female 
board membership correlated positively with market valuation in countries greater gender 
parity while the relationship was negative in countries with low gender parity. This finding 
implies that in Nordic countries such as Finland and Sweden, female representation in the 
board would correlate positively with firm valuation. Both the counties are in the top five 
of the Global Gender Gap Report 2017 published by World Economic Forum (2017). As 
such, it is interesting see how does the relationship between gender diversity and firm 
valuations correlate in the IPO’s in Finland and Sweden.  
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3. HYPOTHESES 
 
In the previous chapter we were discussing the past research literature on the board’s role 
in corporate governance and firm performance. Based on the observations noted in the past 
literature we will now proceed to develop our hypotheses relating to the empirical test over 
correlation between IPO valuation and board characteristics. 
Board size has been studied and proposed as an attribute that influences the effectiveness 
of board’s ability to operate. The relationship between oversized boards and inefficient 
decision making has been documented in the past research (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993). Large board size have been associated with awarding larger compensation 
packages to CEO (Core at al. 1999; Cahan et al. 2005) and board are more easily to be 
influenced by CEO due to the dispersed power in board with too many members (Jensen 
1993). Yermack (1996) had similar results in his paper concluding that small boardrooms 
increase firm’s market value. Lipton and Lorch (1992) propose a preferred number of 
board seats is eight or nine members while Jensen (1993) has similar result suggesting a 
board with more than seven or eight members are likely to be less functional.  
H1: Smaller boards correlate positively with firm valuation. 
Board’s main responsibility is to monitor the top management ensuring its actions serve 
the shareholders. The theory and different studies in the academic research show that 
independence of board improves board’s ability to fulfill its role in the safeguard of the 
investors and this has been noted to correlate positively with firm performance (see Coles 
et al. 2008, Byrd et al. 1992, Cotter et al. 1997). However, there is mixed evidences of the 
correlation between independence and firm performance (Hermalin & Weisbach 1991, 
Bhagat & Black 2002). While Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) did not see correlation 
between board independence and firm performance they stated that board composition 
appears to correlate positively with corporate governance issues including CEO 
replacement, acquisitions, poison pills and executive composition. As such, overall the past 
studies indicate that board independence may contribute positively to investors’ perception 
of a firm’s governance and thus add to the valuation of an entity.  
H2: Board independence correlates positively with the firm valuation 
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The CEO has an incentive to “capture” the board in order to secure his or her job and 
maximize the compensation. (Hermalin et al. 2003). The unfavorable implications of CEO-
chairman dual role was, for instance, observed in a study by Farber (2005) showing that 
fraud was more common in companies with CEO as a chair of the board. Also, the positive 
correlation between CEO compensation and CEO-chairman duality has been documented 
in the past research (e.g. Core al al 1999, Cahan et al. 2005). These findings indicate that 
the board is less efficient in restricting the power of CEO when the CEO is the chair. As 
such, these findings in the previous studies indicate that when the CEO has the dual 
position and as such might negatively affect the valuation investors give to a company. 
H3: Firms with CEO-chairman dual role are given discounted valuations 
Post and Byron (2015) found that female board membership correlated positively with 
market valuation in countries greater gender parity while the relationship was negative in 
countries with low gender parity. This finding implies that in Nordic countries such as 
Finland and Sweden, female representation in the board would correlate positively with 
firm valuation.  
H4: Boards with more equal gender representation correlate positively with firm 
valuation. 
We will test these hypotheses in the chapter 5 “Empirical results”. First, we will present 
the methodology as well as the data we will use to execute the empirical test. 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Data  
 
This study is conducted with initial public offerings made in Finland and Sweden during 
2012-2015. The data includes both firms listed in the main stock exchanges Nasdaq 
Helsinki and Nasqad Stockholm as well as the less regulated First North exchanges in 
Helsinki and Stockholm. We exclude financial companies as they operate in a more 
regulated environment compared to non-financial companies.   
It is a topical matter to study the board characteristics in the new listings because 2012-
2015 saw high volumes of new IPOs. Further, the First North marketplace is a relatively 
new set up to exchange stocks in the Nordics and therefore it is interesting to compare the 
firms listing in the main market and the alternative exchange.  
The data consists of the financial statement data, stock price, and the details of the board of 
directors. The financial data is retrieved from listing companies prospectuses while the 
stock price on the listing day in obtained from Nasqad website and Orbis data resource. 
The data concerning the characteristics of boards is handpicked from the prospectuses and 
the financial reports which are available on the firms’ websites.  
 
4.2. Method 
 
We will conduct this study by performing an OLS regression analysis measuring the 
relationship between the IPO valuation and the board characteristics discussed in the 
earlier sections. Through the regression analysis, we can observe the potential impact of 
board characteristics to the firm valuation at the initial public offering stage. First, we will 
present how we measure the dependent variable IPO valuation. Next, we will discuss the 
independent and control variables of the regression analysis. In the last section of the 
chapter, construct the regression analysis models. 
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4.2.1. Dependent variable: IPO valuation 
 
For modelling the relationship between IPO valuation and board characteristics, we first 
need to establish valuation measure that best presents the relative value perceived by 
investors. As of the measurement of firm valuation, we will use Tobin’s Q. This is ratio 
calculated as the market value of a firm divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. 
Tobin’s Q Ratio 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
  
Tobin’s Q has been used in other studies to measure the relative valuation of firms as the 
measure compares the stock price paid by investors compared to the assets in the books 
(e.g. Hermalin & Weisbach 1991, Bhagat & Black 2002, Gompers et al. 2003). Tobin’s Q 
ratio indicates the price above or below the asset price of the business and thus represents 
the expectations of investors over the firm’s ability to perform.  
For the total market value, we will use market cap of the firm shares plus the book value of 
the liabilities. For the market cap, we will use the value of the shares at the end of the first 
trading day of the initial public offering. The total liabilities and asset values will be 
retrieved from the latest balance sheet represented in the prospectus of the offering.   
In our regression model we will use a natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable. Our analysis of the Tobin’s Q showed very high values of the Tobin’s Q among 
the firm observation (refer to table 5). Therefore, we opted to use natural log instead of the 
nominal value because of the high spectrum of values in the firm observations in order to 
normalize the values and avoid potential effect of outliers. The high variation is reasonable 
because firms that list in the market are often at relatively early stage of life and the market 
valuation includes expectations on the future growth of earnings.  
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4.2.2. Independent variables: board characteristics 
 
The board characteristics are the independent variables in the focus of this study. We have 
chosen four key variables to examine in the empirical test. 
Board size is determined by the number of directors in the board at the time of the IPO.  
Board independence is measured as a ratio of independent directors relative to the total 
number of directors in a board. An independent director is defined in this study as a 
member who does not belong to the executive management. Generally accepted corporate 
governance recommendations such as the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015 
and the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015 classify directors who are in the 
management as non-independent. Furthermore, this attribute is feasible and effective 
measure to account for the board independence. 
CEO-chairman duality is also an additional variable that closely relates to the board’s 
ability to independently assess executive management performance and represent the 
interests of the shareholders. This is a dummy variable that will given value 1 if the CEO 
acts as a chairman and value zero if the roles separated. 
Finally, the last independent variable of the regression model is gender representation. 
This will be measured as a ratio of female directors relative to the total board size.  
  
4.2.3. Control variables: firm characteristics 
 
We will include control variables in the regression analysis to account for other factors that 
contribute to the firm valuation. First control variable is the size of company measured as a 
natural logarithm of the total asset book value disclosed in the prospectus. For instance, 
Yermack (1996) used the same variable to control for firm size. The profitability of the 
firm naturally has impact on the valuation. To account for the profitability we use 
operating profit to total assets ratio as a controlling variable. This study covers multiple 
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years (2012-2015) and therefore we will use dummy variable to eliminate the impact of 
year. Also, we consider the impact of industry on the firm valuation. The industries are 
defined based on the industry categories reported by Nasdaq that utilizes the Industry 
Classification Benchmark standard including 13 different industries. Finally, we will 
control the market place (main market vs First North) and the listing country in the model. 
Below is a summary of the defined variables. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Regression analysis - variable definitions 
Variable Variable definition 
TobinsQ Tobin's Q 
LNTQ Natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q 
BoardSize Number of directors in board. Indicates the board set up and dynamics. 
BoardInd Ratio of independent directors relative to total number. Indicates board 
independence. 
BoardDual CEO-Chairman duality dummy variable. Indicates the board set up and dynamics.  
FemDirectors Ratio of female directors relative to total number. Indicates gender representation 
in board. 
LN(BV) Natural logarithm of total asset book value indicating the size of firm. 
OP/BV Operating profit to book value of assets ratio indicating the firm performance. 
Year Dummy variable for the year of IPO to eliminate impact of timing.  
Industry 
Main_FN 
 
Country 
Dummy variable for the industry to eliminate industry impact on valuation. 
Dummy variable for the listing exchange defined as main market of First North 
marketplace 
Dummy variable for country 
 
This table defines the variables used in the models.  
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
4.2.4. Regression analysis 
 
In the previous sections, we have defined the variables that will be considered in the 
regression analysis. In this section, we will formulate the equation to model the regression 
analysis.  This study is performed by using quantitative analysis to identify correlations 
between firm valuation and the board characteristics as hypothesized in the third chapter. 
We will use multiple regression analysis as the research method. We reflect the results of 
the regression analysis relative to the past results of academic research on the relationship 
between board and firm performance and valuation. Additionally, we analyze the data with 
descriptive statistics and correlation analysis.  
The empirical analysis is performed in two stages. First, we will study the impact of the 
firm specific variables on the IPO valuation to have understanding over how the firm 
specifics alone affect the valuation. The regression is modelled through the following 
equation: 
𝐿𝑁𝑇𝑄 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑁(𝐵𝑉) +
𝛽2𝑂𝑃
𝐵𝑉
+  𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝐹𝑁 +  𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦   
 
In the second stage, we add the actual independent variables into the equation. Thus, our 
equation for the second stage is: 
 𝐿𝑁𝑇𝑄 = 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 +  𝛽4𝐹𝑒𝑚𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +
 𝛽5𝐿𝑁(𝐵𝑉) +
𝛽6𝑂𝑃
𝐵𝑉
+  𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝛽9𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝐹𝑁 +  𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦  
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5. RESULTS 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
In this chapter we are presenting details over the sample selection and how the final sample 
was reached. Further, we will discuss the key characteristics of the sample and compare the 
results between the main market and Fist North listed companies.  
Review of firm observations 
The data was collected from Nasdaq website, Orbis data resource and the prospectuses 
issued by the companies. During the sample period 2012-2015 there were total 113 IPOs 
issued in Finland and Sweden. Within these companies there were 11 samples for which 
the prospectus was not available at the time of this study and therefore we needed to 
exclude these companies as the necessary data was not available. Next, we performed a 
boxplot analysis of each variable to identify outliers in the data. We excluded samples that 
had a variable with value more than 3 times the interquartile range in order to avoid 
abnormal observations and to improve reliability of the regression model. As a result, we 
excluded total of 12 samples with six instances due to outliers in Tobin’s Q and six 
instances due to outliers in OP/BV variable. The final sample size of the study amounted to 
90 firm observations with details laid out in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 Sample selection criteria 
Firm observations Main market First North Total 
IPOs in Nasdaq 34 79 113 
Less:    
Companies with missing data -4 -7 -11 
Outliers in Tobin's Q 0 -6 -6 
Outliers in OP/BV variable 0 -6 -6 
Total Sample 30 60 90 
 
This table presents how the final sample was reached. 
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In the final sample we had 30 observations from the main market and 60 observations from 
the First North marketplace. Thus, we can see that the listing activity was higher in the 
alternative marketplace that is reasonable as it has less strict requirements. Also, we 
conclude that our final sample is consistent with the distribution between Main market and 
First North before the exclusions we had to do in the final sample.  
The distribution of sample by industry and country is presented in the table 3 below. The 
top two industries in both Main market and First North are the same: Industrials (Main: 
37%, FN: 28%) and Health Care (Main: 20%, FN: 27%). The biggest difference between 
the market places is Technology sector which has 12 listings (20%) in First North 
compared to two listings in the Main market (7%). The IPO activity has been substantially 
higher in Sweden (75 listings) compared to Finland (15 listings).  
Table 3 Sample distribution by country and industry 
Main market  
Finland % Sweden % Total Total % 
Basic Materials 1 14 %           -      0 % 1 3 % 
Consumer Goods              -      0 % 5 22 % 5 17 % 
Consumer Services 2 29 % 2 9 % 4 13 % 
Health Care 1 14 % 5 22 % 6 20 % 
Industrials 3 43 % 8 35 % 11 37 % 
Oil & Gas              -      0 %           -      0 % 0 0 % 
Technology              -      0 % 2 9 % 2 7 % 
Telecommunications              -      0 % 1 4 % 1 3 % 
Main market Total 7   23   30 100 % 
First North 
 Finland % Sweden % Total Total % 
Basic Materials              -      0 % 2 4 % 2 3 % 
Consumer Goods              -      0 % 4 8 % 4 7 % 
Consumer Services 1 13 % 5 10 % 6 10 % 
Health Care 1 13 % 15 29 % 16 27 % 
Industrials 4 50 % 13 25 % 17 28 % 
Oil & Gas              -      0 % 3 6 % 3 5 % 
Technology 2 25 % 10 19 % 12 20 % 
Telecommunications              -      0 %           -      0 % 0 0 % 
First North Total 8  52  60 100 % 
Total 15   75   90   
 
This table shows how the sample firm observations are distributed among industries by country and 
listing market. The industry classification is based on the Nasdaq Nordic Exchange classification. 
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The listing activity has been increasing year over year during the sample period. Below Is 
table 4 which presents the listing activity by year. The IPO activity has been picking pace 
since 2012. We will control the listing year in our regression model as the listing year can 
affect the firm valuation as the financial markets have been improving since 2012.  
 
Table 4 Sample distribution by year 
Industry 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Main Market 0 4 11 15 30 
Finland              -      3 1 3 7 
Sweden              -      1 10 12 23 
First North 4 6 21 29 60 
Finland 1              -      3 4 8 
Sweden 3 6 18 25 52 
Total 4 10 32 44 90 
 
Above we have reviewed the details over the IPO activity during the sample period and 
statistics over the firm observations within the sample. Next, we will focus on the 
descriptive statistics over the variables. 
Descriptive statistics over the regression variables 
In our regression analysis we measure the impact of board characteristics on IPO valuation 
through Tobin’s Q. Below is Table 5 is descriptive statistics over the distribution of the 
Tobin’s Q value among the sample observations. 
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics over regression variables 
 
 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics over the regression variables. 
 
In the table 5 is presented descriptive statistics over the regression variables. Based on the 
analysis we can see differences in the attributes between firms listed in Main market and 
First North listings. Tobin’s Q deviates more in the First North entities with standard 
deviation of 3,52 compared to 2,73 in the Main market listings. This indicates that the 
valuation in the First North companies relative to the book value fluctuates more in the 
First North listings, which is reasonable as the companies are smaller in size and valuation 
is more dependent on future expectations.  
We can also see the difference in the size of companies by looking at the natural logarithm 
of book value which averages 21,07 at Main market compared to 17,19 at First North. 
Also, the operating profit relative to balance sheet book value fluctuates notably more in 
the First North (standard deviation: 0,39) compared to Main market (0,07). Further, the 
median OP/BV ratio at First North is negative 0,07 indicating that majority of the FN firms 
recorded operating loss and consequently valuation of these companies is dependent more 
on reaching future profitability. The relatively large deviation among the First North listed 
companies can also make more challenging to find correlation between the valuation of 
firms relative to the dependent variables since there is high deviation in the firm 
characteristics. 
Based on the descriptive statistics presented in table 5 we can also see variation between 
Main market and Forth North listed firms relative to the independent variables. The median 
Variable Minimum Maximum Median Std. Deviation 
 Main FN All Main FN All Main FN All Main FN All 
TobinsQ 0,96 0,84 0,84 13,35 16,29 16,29 1,73 3,98 3,04 2,73 3,52 3,45 
BoardSize 4,00 3,00 3,00 9,00 8,00 9,00 6,50 5,00 5,00 1,20 1,11 1,31 
BoardInd 0,50 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,83 0,88 0,13 0,15 0,15 
FemDirectors 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,50 0,50 0,17 0,00 0,14 0,10 0,12 0,12 
BoardDual 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
LN(BV) 17,49 13,84 13,84 23,67 21,32 23,67 21,38 17,22 17,91 1,80 1,48 2,37 
OP/BV -0,09 -1,42 -1,42 0,30 0,41 0,41 0,07 -0,07 0,03 0,07 0,39 0,35 
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number of directors at Main market is 6,5 compared to 5 at First North. Further, the 
independence of board at Main market is higher with median value 100% compared to 
83% at First North. Also, we can observe that the portion of female directors is higher at 
Main market (median: 17%) than at First North (0%).  
In table 6 we compare the variables by year and market place. Median board size in the 
Main market listings has fluctuated between 5,5 and 7. In the last observed year (2015) 
which has most samples the median board size was 6 and the standard deviation in 2015 
was lowest indicating that the heterogeneity of board size was highest during 2015. At 
First North the median board size has remained at the same level each year amounting to 5 
directors. Also, at First North the standard deviation is lowest at 2015 indicating 
convergence in the board size among the listing firms. 
Board independence has same median value across the observation period each year at 
Main market amounting to 100% median value. The observed minimum value has 
increased from 50% observed in 2012 to 70% observed in 2014 and 2015. At First North 
listings the board independence measure has fluctuated over years and no evident patterns 
is visible with median independence ratio varying between 80% and 100%. Also, it is 
notable that the standard deviation of board independence ratio (0,2) in the last observation 
year (2015) is higher compared to Main market IPOs (0,1). This indicates that there is 
more variation in First North listings and the board independence is not as strong attribute 
in the Fist North listings as it is in Main market firms. 
We note that there is an upwards trend in the gender representation year over year. At 
Main market the median portion of female directors was 10% in 2013 compared to 30% in 
2014 and 20% is 2015. At First North listings the trend is less evident as the highest 
median value was in 2013 with 20% compared to decreasing measures of 10% in 2014 and 
0% in 2015.  
Finally, the statistics show that none of the sample firms had a CEO-chairman dual role. 
This clearly shows that companies in Finland and Sweden have implemented the corporate 
governance principle around separation of the CEO and chairman roles. This interesting as 
it may be expected that many firms that offer IPO will have a founder as a large 
shareholder and possibly with an active role in management of the company. Clearly, even 
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if founder is in CEO position the firms and founders of these firms have adopted the 
principle to separate the roles. As we concluded that our sample has no variation in the 
CEO-chairman variable we will not include this variable in our model and further statistics. 
 
Table 6 – Descriptive statistics over IPOs by year and marketplace 
 
  Minimum Maximum Median Std. Deviation 
Main Market 12  13 14 15 12 13 14 15 12 13 14 15 12 13 14 15 
TobinsQ - 1,0 1,0 1,0 - 2,5 2,0 13,3 - 1,5 1,7 1,8 - 0,6 0,3 3,6 
BoardSize - 4,0 4,0 6,0 - 7,0 8,0 9,0 - 5,5 7,0 6,0 - 1,3 1,2 1,1 
BoardInd - 0,5 0,7 0,7 - 1,0 1,0 1,0 - 1,0 1,0 1,0 - 0,3 0,1 0,1 
FemDirectors - 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,2 0,3 0,3 - 0,1 0,3 0,2 - 0,1 0,1 0,1 
LN(BV) - 17,5 19,4 17,8 - 21,0 23,7 23,7 - 20,3 21,8 20,6 - 1,6 1,2 2,1 
OP/BV - 0,0 0,0 -0,1 - 0,1 0,1 0,3 - 0,1 0,1 0,1 - 0,1 0,0 0,1 
First North 12  13 14 15 12 13 14 15 12 13 14 15 12 13 14 15 
TobinsQ 3,6 1,6 1,0 0,8 8,3 10,8 16,3 14,6 4,1 5,0 4,0 4,1 2,3 3,2 4,0 3,5 
BoardSize 5,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 6,0 7,0 8,0 8,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 0,5 1,3 1,2 1,1 
BoardInd 0,6 0,7 0,6 0,5 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,9 0,8 1,0 0,8 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,2 
FemDirectors 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,5 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 
LN(BV) 15,4 15,5 14,9 13,8 18,8 18,3 20,4 21,3 17,1 16,6 17,7 17,2 1,5 1,0 1,6 1,5 
OP/BV -0,4 -0,5 -1,4 -1,3 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,4 
 
Table presents descriptive statistics over the firm observations by year and marketplace between 
2012-2015.  Number of firm observations: 
Main market: 2012: 0; 2013: 4; 2014: 11; 2015: 15. 
First North:    2012: 4; 2013: 6; 2014: 21; 2015: 29. 
 
Based on review of the variable’s standard deviations we can note that the fluctuation is 
not significant and as such there should not exist abnormal values that disturb results of the 
regression analysis. Before moving into the regression analysis, we will review correlation 
between the dependent and independent variables. It is worthwhile to review correlation 
between the independent variables in order to identify possible collinearity relationships.  
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5.2. Pearson and Spearman correlation 
 
Table 7 Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix 
  LNTQ BoardSize BoardIndepenence FemDirectors LN(BV) OP/BV Main_FN Year Industry 
LNQ 1,000 -0,131 -0,049 -0,079 -,602** -0,168 -,420** 0,070 ,278** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0,220 0,647 0,462 0,000 0,113 0,000 0,510 0,008 
BoardSize -0,118 1,000 ,271** 0,017 ,445** 0,172 ,546** 0,016 0,091 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,269   0,010 0,874 0,000 0,106 0,000 0,881 0,396 
BoardIndepenence -0,052 ,266* 1,000 0,170 0,132 -0,013 ,210* 0,007 -0,132 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,627 0,011   0,108 0,216 0,901 0,046 0,950 0,216 
FemDirectors -0,043 0,043 0,183 1,000 ,209* -0,057 ,250* -0,033 0,095 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,687 0,690 0,084   0,048 0,592 0,017 0,758 0,375 
LN(BV) -,563** ,470** 0,115 ,227* 1,000 ,337** ,711** 0,051 -,291** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,280 0,031   0,001 0,000 0,636 0,005 
OP/BV -,321** 0,147 -0,088 -0,024 ,386** 1,000 ,326** 0,012 -,215* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,002 0,167 0,409 0,822 0,000   0,002 0,908 0,042 
Main_FN -,406** ,542** 0,202 ,247* ,749** ,334** 1,000 0,036 -0,146 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,056 0,019 0,000 0,001   0,738 0,170 
Year 0,029 0,052 0,027 0,032 0,104 -0,008 0,066 1,000 -0,166 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,788 0,625 0,798 0,766 0,328 0,939 0,537   0,118 
Industry ,262* 0,101 -0,117 0,107 -,250* -0,195 -0,135 -0,186 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,013 0,342 0,273 0,315 0,018 0,066 0,206 0,080   
 
The matrix presents the Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal) coefficients between variables (n = 90). For variable 
definitions refer to the table 1. ** stands for correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), and * for the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7 presents both Pearson and Spearman correlations among the regression variables. 
The results demonstrate that the independent variables do not have significant correlation 
with board characteristics. The strongest correlation with LNQ is associated with Board 
Size, however, the p-value is 0,27 and thus not statistically significant. The correlation 
with firm valuation is negative 0,12 indicating that firms with smaller boards are valued 
with higher equity value in IPOs. Also, surprisingly, board independence is associated with 
negative correlation, however, the beta is close to zero amounting t -0,05 and with p-value 
of 0,63. Similar results are with gender representation (beta of -0,4 and p-value of 0,68). 
The control variables have higher p-values relative to the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. 
The IPO valuation, as measured by natural log of Tobin’s Q, is statistically correlated with 
LN(BV) (correlation of -0,56). The negative correlation indicates that companies with 
smaller balance sheet are in a more early stage of the firm life and might be operating in a 
sector such as technology which requires less capital in the balance sheet. Further, OP/BV 
is negatively correlated with LNQ with beta of +0,32. This is likely to result from similar 
reasons as LN(BV) ratio relating to smaller, fast growing businesses. Finally, industry 
dummy variable was statistically significant relative to the firm valuation while listing year 
was not found to be statistically significant. 
Additionally, we observed that the control variable Main_FN variable had significant 
correlation with all the independent variables as well as LN(BV) and OP/BV control 
variables. Therefore, we decided to exclude the variable from the regression model in order 
to avoid disturbance of results due to multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, we noted that since the classification between Main market listings and First 
North listings correlates with many of the variables we decided to run the regression model 
separately for the Main market sample and First North sample since according to the 
correlation analytics separation between Main market and First North is driving the firm 
valuation. Thus, we will investigate if there are differences in the results of regression 
analysis among these two group of listings. To observe in more detail the relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables we will next review results of the 
regression analysis. 
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5.3. OLS regression analysis 
 
In this chapter we will review the results of testing the sample with the regression models 
presented earlier. The regression analyses are executed in phases. First, we will investigate 
the sole impact of firm characteristics on the IPO valuation, while in the second phase we 
will add the variables measuring board characteristics. Further, we will test perform the 
test to the combined data set as well as separately to the Main market and First North 
samples. The tests are performed across the total time period as this study is not a time 
series test but rather focuses on the determinants on IPO valuation as a cross-sectional 
research.  
5.3.1. Impact of firm characteristics on IPO valuation 
 
In table 8 we present the results of regression analysis in which we study the impact of 
firm characteristics on the IPO valuation. These firm characteristics will be used in the 
final regression model as control variables. We have performed the analysis both on the 
total firm population as well as separately over the Main market and Fist North listings and 
these results are presented in the table. 
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Table 8 Impact of firm characteristics on IPO valuation 
  All firms Main market First North 
Variable β Sig. β Sig. β Sig. 
(Constant) 4,607 0,000 3,030 0,128 6,529 0,000 
Control variables      
 
LN(BV) -0,235 0,000 -0,143 0,140 -0,293 0,000 
OP/BV 0,305 0,238 1,290 0,529 0,360 0,214 
Industry 
      
Industrials - - - - -0,197 0,337 
BasicMaterials 0,715 0,029 0,995 0,137 0,321 0,427 
OilGas -0,022 0,952 0,263 0,695 -0,526 0,233 
ConsumerGoods -0,016 0,939 0,301 0,382 -0,384 0,162 
ConsumerServices 0,130 0,570 0,201 0,625 -0,055 0,868 
HealthCare 0,186 0,276 0,082 0,828 - - 
Telecommunications -0,358 0,550 -0,566 0,439 - - 
Technology 0,532 0,012 - - 0,290 0,195 
Market 
      
Main_FN (FN=0, 
Main=1) 
0,500 0,023 - - - - 
Year 
      
Yr2012 - - - - - - 
Yr2013 0,468 0,086 0,085 0,905 0,194 0,500 
Yr2014 0,497 0,002 0,579 0,155 - - 
Yr2015 - - - - -0,466 0,009 
Country (FIN=0, 
SWE=1) 0,453 0,019 0,478 0,212 0,234 0,363 
N 90 30 60 
Adj. R^2 0,440 0,126 0,425 
Model F-value 6,372 1,381 4,964 
Model sig. <0,001 0,262 <0,001 
 
The table shows impact of firm characteristics on IPO valuation on total sample as well as broken 
down in Main market and First North listings. The table reports correlation coefficients (β) and 
statistical significance. Correlation coefficients with statistical significance at 5 per cent have been 
bolded. 
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Based on the statistics reported in table 5 we can see that size of firm measured as natural 
logarithm of total book value affects the firm valuation with high statistical significance 
(sig. < 0,001). The correlation is negative with firm valuation, which indicates that the 
smaller sized companies have higher IPO valuations. This might be driven by that smaller 
companies get higher valuation factors given higher growth expectations compared to 
stabilized businesses. The correlation between operating performance (measured as 
operating profit to book value) and firm valuation failed to conclude significant correlation 
with p-value of 0,238. The correlation coefficient is positive (0,035), which is consistent 
with our expectations. 
Significant correlation was found for marketplace (Main market vs First North) with 
correlation coefficient of positive 0,5. This indicates that firms listed in the Main market 
are valued higher. Further, the year dummy variable was found to have significant impact 
on the valuation and thus it is reasonable to include the dummy in the final regression. 
However, as we noted in the Pearson and Spearman correlation analyses (refer to table 7) 
the Main_FN variable correlates with the other independent variables. In order to avoid 
multicollinearity problem we will run the regression model without the Main-FN variable.  
Further, the country of listing was found with significant impact on IPO valuation with p-
value of 0,019. The dummy variable indicates that firms listed in Sweden were given 
higher valuations.  
Further, we ran the regression analysis for the Main market and First North listings 
separately. The results show that the Main market specific sample is not statistically 
significant (p-value 0,262) while the First North specific sample is significant (p-value less 
than 0,001).  The adjusted R2 value for the total sample amounts 0,440 and for First North 
amounts to 0,425. Next we will combine the control variables with the independent 
variables that focus on the board characteristics and run the complete regression model.  
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5.3.2. Impact of board characteristics on IPO valuation 
 
In table 9 is presented the results of the regression analyses that have been performed to 
investigate the board characteristics that are the focus of this study. The regression analysis 
was run for the total sample as well as separately broken down into Main market and First 
North listings in order to potentially identify the key underlying differences between Main 
market and First North listings. The regression analysis was run with two different models 
for each sample. In column (1) presented in the table we used all the variables identified 
earlier in the methodology build up of the regression model. In column (2) we eliminated 
all the variables that were identified to have little explanatory power over the board – IPO 
valuation relationship based on the analyses performed in earlier sections. In model (2) we 
included BoardSize, LN(BV), and Country variables.  
The regression model 1 has a relatively strong correlation with the IPO valuation resulting 
in adjusted R square of 0,36. This can be deemed as a satisfying level of explanatory 
power. Further, the regression model is statistically significant with p-value less than 
0,001. When we run the regression analysis with model 2 that includes less variables there 
are not significant differences in the correlation coefficients nor in the statistical 
significance of the model. Therefore, we observe that the BoardSize, LN(BV), and Country 
variables have high level of explanatory value over the firm value of the sample firm 
observations.  
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Table 9 Impact of board characteristics on IPO valuation 
 All firms Main market First North 
Variable β Sig. β Sig. β Sig. β Sig. β Sig. β Sig. 
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
(Constant) 4,281 0,000 4,429 0,000 2,002 0,341 3,515 0,025 6,530 0,000 6,124 0,000 
Independent variables                  
BoardSize 0,134 0,031 0,135 0,014 0,007 0,950 0,115 0,225 0,145 0,104 0,116 0,110 
BoardIndepenence -0,125 0,792 - - -0,081 0,932 - - -0,396 0,493 - - 
FemDirectors 0,434 0,441 - - 1,563 0,241 - - 0,140 0,840 - - 
Control variables               
 
 
 
LN(BV) -0,240 0,000 -0,240 0,000 -0,133 0,141 -0,194 0,013 -0,340 0,000 -0,329 0,000 
OP/BV -0,061 0,806 - - 2,226 0,224 - - -0,072 0,804 - - 
Industry 0,008 0,789 - - -0,003 0,960 - - -0,019 0,610 - - 
Year 0,067 0,393 - - 0,248 0,177 - - 0,014 0,880 - - 
Country 0,473 0,014 0,530 0,003 0,355 0,311 0,660 0,038 0,442 0,115 0,454 0,056 
N 90 90 30 30 60 60 
Adj. R^2 0,364 0,390 0,184 0,178 0,266 0,321 
Model F-value 7,379 19,936 1,819 3,094 3,666 10,305 
Model sig. <0,001 <0,001 0,130 0,044 0,002 <0,001 
 
The table shows impact of board characteristics on IPO valuation on total sample as well as broken down in Main market and First North listings. 
The table reports correlation coefficients (β) and statistical significance. Correlation coefficients with statistical significance at 5 per cent have been 
bolded. Each sample has been run with two different models: (1) columns have been run with regression model including all the selected variables 
while (2) columns have been run with only the most significant variables identified in the previous analyses: BoardSize, LN(BV), and Country. 
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Out of the board characteristics included in our regression model, the only variable that we 
found to have statistically significant impact on IPO valuation is BoardSize. The variable 
was statistically significant at 5 per cent. The correlation coefficient is 0,134 indicating that 
increase in board size adds to the firm valuation. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis 
H1 which predicted smaller boards to impact valuations positively. Board independence 
correlated negatively with IPO valuation with coefficient correlation of negative -0,125. 
This is inconsistent with our hypothesis H2. However, our regression models failed to have 
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable and therefore, we cannot 
conclude on the sign of correlation. Finally, we compared the impact of gender 
representation on the firm valuation. Similar to the independence measure, we failed to 
find statistically significant correlation with the firm valuation (p-value 0,441). The 
correlation between female directors and IPO valuation was positive consistent with our 
hypothesis. The positive relationship was especially more powerful with Main market 
listings (coefficient correlation of 1,563) compared to First North (0,140). 
Further, we compared the regression analysis results between the Main market and First 
North listings. Model 1 was statistically significant at the First North sample (p-value 
0,002) while at the Main market sample the model 1 was slightly above the threshold (p-
value 0,130). However, when we ran the model 2 with less variables the model was 
significant also for Main market sample at p-value of 0,044. In model 2 we investigated the 
impact of Board Size on firm valuation. Based on the results the coefficient correlation was 
close between the Main market and First North samples (0,115 vs 0,116).  
As an additional analysis, we ran the regression model separately by country and by year 
based on which country the company was listed. These analyses provide evidence over 
whether the country environment and timing affect the results. The results per country are 
presented in table 10 while results by year are in table 11. Based on the descriptive 
statistics that were presented in earlier section showed variances in the annual statistics, 
which indicates there have been changes in the board structures year over year. Therefore 
running the regression analysis by country and year might provide additional insights into 
the data and the relationship between board set up and IPO valuation.  
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In the country specific results, we can see that the coefficient for board size is similar in 
both countries. We note that the regression for Finland has p-value of 0,0567 and thus is 
slightly above the 5% threshold and needs to be rejected. This may be due to the lower 
sample size of Finnish IPOs (15 firm observations) compared to Sweden (75 firm 
observations). Based on the results we note that the board size has similar relationship both 
in the two countries.  
 
 
Table 10 Regression analysis by country 
  Finland Sweden 
Variable β Sig. β Sig. 
Model (1) (1) 
(Constant) 3,377 0,446 4,602 0,000 
Independent variables       
BoardSize 0,101 0,559 0,139 0,048 
BoardIndepenence 0,105 0,920 -0,225 0,686 
FemDirectors -0,719 0,750 0,582 0,348 
Control variables       
LN(BV) -0,184 0,343 -0,239 0,000 
OP/BV 2,071 0,194 -0,132 0,637 
Industry 0,034 0,781 0,002 0,941 
Year -0,024 0,927 0,125 0,181 
N 15 75 
Adj. R^2 0,567 0,337 
Model F-value 3,620 6,381 
Model sig. 0,056 <0,001 
 
Table presents results of the regression model 1 run separately by country.  
 
Next, we can analyse results by year which are presented in table 11. We see that year 
2013 is not statistically significant with p-value at 0,337. This may be also driven by 
smaller sample size during the year (10 firm observations) and as such the results are less 
reliable compared to 2014 and 2015. In 2014 the results are clearly significant with p-value 
less 0,001. Year 2015 is again insignificant with p-value of 0,071. However, when we 
 43 
 
compare the coefficients for board characteristics between 2014 and 2015 we see 
similarities between the year. Board size is positively correlated at 0,141 in 2014 and 0,137 
in 2015. These results are consistent with the earlier analyses providing evidence over the 
correlation between board size and IPO valuation. However, the p-values for the variables 
are above the 5% threshold.  
 
Table 11 Regression analysis by year 
 
  2013 2014 2015 
Variable β Sig. β Sig. β Sig. 
Model (1) (1) (1) 
(Constant) -0,139 0,981 5,377 0,000 4,094 0,001 
Independent 
variables 
         
BoardSize 0,305 0,343 0,141 0,135 0,137 0,195 
BoardIndepenence -0,927 0,639 -0,337 0,622 -0,433 0,607 
FemDirectors 0,146 0,943 0,559 0,501 1,116 0,250 
Control variables          
LN(BV) -0,037 0,897 -0,275 0,000 -0,204 0,005 
OP/BV -0,385 0,838 -0,119 0,700 -0,307 0,543 
Industry 0,195 0,296 -0,006 0,872 -0,048 0,377 
Country 0,198 0,720 0,367 0,226 0,695 0,057 
N 10 32 44 
Adj. R^2 0,501 0,554 0,15 
Model F-value 2,292 6,502 2,084 
Model sig. 0,337 <0,001 0,071 
 
Table presents results of the regression model 1 run separately by country. Year 2012 was excluded 
as the sample size was 4 firm observations and as such likely to be too small to have statistical 
significance. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the results of this study and how our observations relate to and 
contribute to past research. In addition, we will discuss the limitations of the sample and 
research design of the study. 
This study’s focus was to investigate the relationship between board characteristics and 
firm valuation on IPOs. The descriptive statistics show that the structure of boards is 
relatively consistent across the sample and variance among the firm observations is small. 
However, we can see differences especially when comparing IPOs between the Main 
market and First North listings. We can also identify gradual movements in the structures 
of boards when analyzing the trends in time series. Meanwhile, in our regression analysis 
the only board characteristics that we found have significant correlation with IPO valuation 
was board size. 
Board size 
The median board size in the Main market listings amounted to 6,5 directors while the 
value at First North was 5 directors. Thus, the board sizes were larger in the Main market 
listed companies compared to First North listings. Also, we could the standard deviation 
was lowest in 2015 compared to the earlier year both in Main market and First North 
listings. This indicates that the convergence of board size has been increasing towards the 
endo of the sample periods between 2012-2015.  
Next, it is interesting to compare the statistics of the board sizes in the listings to the past 
literature. The median value 6,5 in Main market and 5 directors at First North and thus the 
board sizes are relatively small. These observations are consistent with past papers that 
have indicated smaller board rooms increase firm’s market value (e.g. Jensen 1993, 
Yermack 1996). As purpose of IPO is typically to maximize the firm valuation when 
shares are sold in the markets it is reasonable that management and the owners try to 
maximize the attractiveness of the firm towards investors. The median value of board size 
is slightly smaller than the preferred board size proposed by Lipton and Lorch (1992) and 
Jensen (1993) who suggested boards of 7-9 directors as optimal.  
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In our regression model board size was the only board characteristic variable where we 
found statistically significant correlation to the IPO valuation. The variable was 
statistically significant at 5 per cent. The correlation coefficient is 0,134 indicating that 
increase in board size adds to the firm valuation. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis 
H1 which predicted smaller boards to impact valuations positively. The different result on 
the direction of correlation compared to the hypothesis may be derive from the relatively 
small size of boards in the firm observations. Negative correlation between board size and 
firm value that has been reported in the past studies by e.g. Jensen (1993) and Yermack 
(1996) has been based on higher average board sizes. Jensen (1993) suggested boards of 7-
8 directors as optimal. As such we can see that the median board sizes in the Finnish and 
Swedish firms were five directors. Thus, it is reasonable that the correlation to firm value 
is positive given the smaller base value on average in the sample.  
Further, as an additional analysis, we compared the regression analysis results between the 
Main market and First North listings running the regression separately for the Main market 
and First North firms (refer to table 9). In the regression analysis we selected less variables 
taking only Board Size from the board characteristics and excluded other board related 
variables from the regression that been noted statistically insignificant. Based on the results 
the coefficient correlation of board size was close to the same value both in the Main 
market (β = 0,115) and First North samples (β = 0,116). These results enforce the 
assessment that board size positively correlates with the firm valuation and we can see that 
the relationship is consistent both in Main market and First North listings.  
 
Board independence 
Board independence (measured as the portion of independent directors relative to the total 
board size) was high close to 100% in the sample across the testing periods. We noted that 
the independence ratio was higher in the Main market listings (median 100%) compared to 
First North (83%) and the variance was higher in First North (std. dev 0,2) than in Main 
market (0,1). This indicates that there is more variation in First North listings and the board 
independence is not as dominant attribute in the Fist North listings compared to Main 
market firms. Also, we noted that that there was no clear pattern visible in the trend at First 
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North listings during 2012-2015 with the mean independence ratio fluctuating between 
80% to 100%. Based on the statistics, there is more variation on the independence ratio in 
First North listings compared to Main market. 
In the regression analysis, board independence correlated negatively with IPO valuation 
with coefficient correlation of negative -0,125. This is inconsistent with our hypothesis H2 
predicting that board independence adds to the firm valuation. However, our regression 
models failed to have statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable and 
therefore, we cannot conclude on the sign of correlation. Theory and different studies in 
the academic research show that independence of board has been noted to correlate 
positively with firm performance (see Coles et al. 2008, Byrd et al. 1992, Cotter et al. 
1997). However, there is mixed evidences of the correlation between independence and 
firm performance (Hermalin & Weisbach 1991, Bhagat & Black 2002). As such our results 
in this study support results of those past studies that have not found correlation between 
the board independence. 
The lack of correlation between board independence and IPO valuation may be influenced 
by the high rate of independent members. The median value of board independence as 
shown in the descriptive statistics is 88%. As such this implies that since firms have 
adopted the principle to include mainly independent directors there is no significant impact 
on the regression analysis whether independent members account to 80% or 100% for 
example. Thus, the results of the regression analysis support the notion of convergence in 
the board independence practices in firms issuing IPO.  
CEO-chairman duality 
The statistics show that none of the sample firms had a CEO-chairman dual role. This 
clearly shows that companies in Finland and Sweden have implemented the corporate 
governance principle around separation of the CEO and chairman roles. This interesting as 
it may be expected that many firms that offer IPO will have a founder as a large 
shareholder and possibly with an active role in management of the company. Clearly, even 
if founder is in CEO position the firms and founders of these firms have adopted the 
principle to separate the roles. 
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Gender representation 
Based on the descriptive statistics we noted that there is an upwards trend in the gender 
representation year over year at Main market with median portion of female directors 
growing from 10% in 2013 to 20% in 2015. At First North listings the trend was not visible 
as the highest median value was in 2013 with 20% compared to decreasing measures of 
10% in 2014 and 0% in 2015. We failed to find statistically significant correlation between 
gender representation and IPO valuation (p-value 0,441). The correlation between female 
directors and IPO valuation was positive consistent with our hypothesis. The positive 
relationship was especially more powerful with Main market listings (coefficient 
correlation of 1,563) compared to First North (0,140). This is in line with findings by Post 
and Byron (2015) who found that female board membership correlated positively with 
market valuation in countries greater gender parity (such as Nordic countries).  
Limitations of the study 
This study provides data and analysis of correlation (and lack thereof) between board 
characteristics and IPO valuations in firm listings in Finland and Sweden between 2012-
2105. There exist limitations over the empirical methods performed and interpretation of 
the results. 
The first limitation pertains to the scope of the sample. This study includes four years of 
listings with total firm observations of 90 firms in the final sample. However, extending 
the sample to more years and countries may improve the reliability of the regression 
results. 
Further, this study does not examine statistically the causal relationship between board 
characteristics and IPO valuation. The hypotheses and interpretation of correlations is 
based on past academic research. Thus, we have reasonable basis to assess the results of 
the regression analysis. 
The empirical data provides an accurate and exhaustive overview of the IPOs in Finland 
and Sweden. The final sample represented 90 observations out of 112 total IPOs during the 
sample period, which amounts to 80% coverage. The trustworthiness of the data is ensured 
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by collecting the stock market data from Nasdaq and Orbis database, while the financial 
data and board information was collected from the prospectuses released by the companies.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1. Summary 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide insights on how the characteristics of board affect 
valuation of entities offering an initial public offer. The agency theory portrays that the 
interests of company management and investors are in conflict by nature, which establishes 
distrust between the principal and the agent. Development of corporate governance has 
been proposed as a one of the most effective methods to certify the quality of the financial 
reporting and create trust in the market. As a company implements an effective corporate 
governance model it can be assumed that the trust towards the quality of financial reporting 
is improved among the market participants and the required rate of return decreases. 
This study examines the impact of board characteristics on the pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings in Finland and Sweden during 2012-2015. By taking the two Nordic countries 
into the scope of the study we will have broad overview of the IPOs in the Nordics. This is 
especially interesting period as the IPO market has been very active during past years and 
therefore there is a broad sample of stock listings that will be examined in this study. 
Further, this study examines differences between the between the Regulated Market 
(Nasdaq Exchanges) and the less strict First North market place (Multilateral Trading 
Facility). This will provide comparison of characteristics of companies listing in the two 
market places.  
The board characteristics for the study were selected based on the key drivers identified in 
the past literature that influence board’s ability to function and are associated with good 
governance practices creating trust towards investors. The selected board characteristics to 
be studied were board size, board independence, CEO-chairman duality, and gender 
representation. 
The empirical part of this study was conducted with initial public offerings made in 
Finland and Sweden during 2012-2015. The data includes both firms listed in the main 
stock exchanges Nasdaq Helsinki and Nasqad Stockholm as well as the less regulated First 
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North exchanges in Helsinki and Stockholm. We excluded financial companies as they 
operate in a more regulated environment compared to non-financial companies.   
The results of the study show that the structure of boards is relatively consistent across the 
sample and variance among the firm observations is small. However, we can see 
differences especially when comparing IPOs between the Main market and First North 
listings. Also, we can identify gradual movements in the structures of boards when 
analyzing the trends in time series. Meanwhile, in our regression analysis the only board 
characteristic that we found have significant correlation with IPO valuation was board size. 
The median value of board size was slightly smaller than the preferred board size proposed 
in earlier research (e.g. Lipton and Lorch (1992) and Jensen (1993) who suggested boards 
of 7-9 directors as optimal). The board size correlated positively with IPO valuation which 
was inconsistent with our hypothesis. The result on the different direction of correlation 
compared to the hypothesis may relate to the smaller board sizes observed in the sample 
relative to results seen in the past research. Earlier research suggested boards of 7-8 
directors as optimal. We can see that the median board sizes in the Finnish and Swedish 
firms were five directors and, thus, it is reasonable that the correlation to firm value is 
positive given the smaller base value on average in the sample.  
Board independence (measured as the portion of independent directors relative to the total 
board size) was high close to 100% in the sample across the testing periods. We noted that 
the independence ratio was higher in the Main market listings (median 100%) compared to 
First North (83%). There was more variation in board independence in First North listings 
compared to Main market firms.  
In the regression analysis, we did not find statistically significant correlation between 
board independence and IPO valuation. The lack of correlation may derive from the high 
rate of independent members implying that since firms in general have adopted the high 
independence rate in board nominations there is no significant variation among firm and 
consequently little impact on the IPO valuation. Thus, the results of the regression analysis 
support the notion of convergence in the board independence practices in firms issuing 
IPO.  
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The statistics show that none of the sample firms had a CEO-chairman dual role. This 
clearly shows that companies in Finland and Sweden have implemented the corporate 
governance principle around separation of the CEO and chairman roles. Clearly, even if 
founder is in CEO position the firms have nevertheless adopted the principle to separate 
the roles. 
Finally, our last board characteristic in focus was gender representation in boards. Based 
on the descriptive statistics we noted that there is an upwards trend in the gender 
representation year over year at Main market while at First North listings the trend was not 
visible. We did not see statistically significant correlation between gender representation 
and IPO valuation.  
The results contribute to the previous literature by showing the relationship between board 
structures and firm value. The results found correlation between board size and IPO 
valuation while other attributes (board independence and gender representation) were not 
found to have significant correlation with firm value. Also, we found that the CEO and 
board chairman roles have been separated in all the firms listing during 2012-2015. This 
indicates the adoption of the corporate governance principle to separate the two roles.  
 
7.2. Further research 
 
The study leaves some questions to be considered for the future. First, the study covered 
only two countries and 4 years of IPOs. Another study with extending the time horizon and 
number of countries may have more exhaustive sample. This could lead to more 
comprehensive results and analysis of the relationships between the variables. 
Future research could extend the variables to be investigated by looking into additional 
attributes of board effectiveness. For instance, we saw that board independence and CEO-
chairman dual role seemed not to have significant impact. There was high convergence of 
the practices on board independence. Therefore, selecting alternative variables may bring 
insights into the key determinants of board characteristics that influence investor behavior 
and valuation of firms.  
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